The report

Since 2011 the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) have published an annual threat report looking at the year ahead. The latest addition was released the 10th of February. They are even so kind to provide an English version in addition to the Norwegian one. The topics of 2020 are:

• Russia
• China
• International terrorism
• Power politics
• The new weapons race
• Conflict, threats, and influence operations in the cyber space.

Most of these subjects can be found in the reports going back to 2011. I will try to unwrap the last bullet point add some context to it.

I will be using structural realism as the point of departure.

Norway 101

First some context: Why would anyone care about a state in the northern part of Europe with a measly 5 million inhabitants? Turns out there are a few possible reasons:

• It is a NATO member.
• Major provider of energy to Europe
• High tech private sector
  • Oil and gas, including sub-surface.
  • Maritime, e.g. ship building
  • Space
  • Defense
• Its geographical placement in the “High North”.

The cyber

Russia

NIS has traditionally been heavily geared towards Russia which is quite natural as the countries share a border. Post-Cold War there were a shift towards international engagements in the Norwegian military, and it is safe to assume this included the Intelligence service. The shift towards out of area operations has been driven by NATO reforms. However, since the relationship between Russia and the West went sour, Russia is back in the limelight.

The Russian services conduct intelligence operations in Norway with the aim of gaining insight into Norwegian High North and defence policies, military readiness plans, the establishment of new military infrastructure and allied activity. They also show an interest in political matters in Norway, including public bodies and political decision-making
processes, Norway’s Arctic policy and Norwegian positions in international negotiations.

Focus 2020 – page 65

Again, as Norway is firmly entrenched in “team West”, the Norwegian intelligence targets should surprise no one.

Russia will do what they can in order balance any NATO capabilities in the High North. The various government departments handling these policy areas as well as public servants in the northern municipalities is almost certain to be targeted by Russian intelligence. This will include cyber operations as well as more traditional espionage activities. Little public reporting exist that tie Russia to any espionage activities in Norway, so there are no examples to provide here (please give me a heads up if I missed something).

Next of interest is the potential for Russian influence operations.

Russian influence operations now appear more sophisticated than in the past. For one thing, rapid developments in information technology have led to the emergence of new platforms and methods for spreading misinformation and promoting specific viewpoints. For another, the evolution of the operations show that the actors are increasingly adapting their operations to audiences in different countries.

(…) However, the approach to Norway – and others – has seen a shift in the content spread via digital platforms. Whereas emphasis in previous years has been on targeted campaigns with the help of fake news, there is now an emergence of non-independent news platforms spreading content from established media platforms.

Focus 2020 – page 69

So far there have been no public reporting of Russian influence operations targeting Norway specifically (please correct me if I’m wrong). If I were to speculate on what might start an influence operation it would be the current diplomatic spat involving Svalbard. Moscow claim that Norway violates the Svalbard Treaty by discriminating Russian activity in the archipelago. This narrative is not new, but in the recent year it has gotten an extra omph to it. Svalbard is of minuscule economical value for Russia, but of great importance their military should an active conflict with the West arise. In the spirit of speculation, a possible outcome is that the Kremlin will create a narrative around Svalbard that will “allow” them take action should they have the need (e.g. send some troops to secure Russian citizens). It will be interesting to see how this situation plays out in the coming months and years.

China

China has gotten attention since the initial Focus report in 2011, although with only two pages back then. In the 2020 report NIS used 14 pages on China. This is still substantially less than what Russia got with its 32 pages.

Chinese actors have shown a particular interest in high technology that
can have both military and civilian applications, and have succeeded in compromising several Norwegian targets in recent years. The scope of collection on political targets appears to be growing.

Focus 2020 – page 65

Aside from the usual “smash-and-grab” of intellectual property China is almost certainly interested in Norway due to its role in the Arctic. In 2018 China released its Arctic Policy Paper in which it lays out its goals and policies for the area. Calling itself a “near-arctic” state might be a stretch (as U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo noted), but it’s clear that China has an interest in the development of the Arctic. Especially noteworthy is China’s goal to establish a Polar Silk Road.

As an Arctic state and a permanent member of the Arctic Council Norway is one of the eight states that decide and implement policy in the region. Being able to gather intelligence on, and ideally influence the Norwegian policy in this matter, is something I’m almost certain that China is attempting to achieve.

With a brewing conflict in the Pacific between the US and China it is but guaranteed that each party will do what they can to get the upper edge. Part of this is collecting intelligence on the capabilities of the opponent. This brings us to what I suspect is a priority for the Chinese intelligence apparatus, namely the Naval Strike Missile (NSM).

The weapons’ deployment sends an important message and can eventually “change the game” in Western Pacific waters, where China now enjoys a 3-to-1 advantage in cruise missiles over the US, said Schuster.

https://web.archive.org/web/20200503083348/https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/10/asia/us-navy-naval-strike-missile-asia-pacific-intl-hnk/index.html

According to structural realism China will take action in order to avoid the balance of power tipping in favor of their opponent. And so we end up in Norway: The NSM was developed by the Norwegian company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace. I don’t have the slightest idea about missiles, but I imagine having the schematics would help in implementing countermeasures to the NSM. If Chinese intelligence isn’t trying to obtain access into Kongsberg’s networks, then someone isn’t doing their job.

Iran

Norwegian universities and research institutions are being used systematically by countries that seek information and knowledge linked to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Foreign
researchers and students connected to foreign universities with ties to military research and development are involved in this activity.

Focus 2020 – page 66

Iran doesn’t get a headline for themselves in the report, but they are involved in some nefarious activities on Norwegian soil. In January, the public broadcaster in Norway, NRK, reported that two scientists working at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) was under investigation by the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST). Articles in Norwegian here and here. The scientists, originally from Iran, had invited a group of scientists also from Iran, without the knowledge of the university. Together they spent an unusual amount of time in a high tech lab used for material analysis. This analysis provides information about the properties of materials and what they can be used for, e.g. cars, boats, or weapons. According to NRK, the two scientists from NTNU had provided unauthorized access to an IT system to “someone” (it doesn’t say if it’s the visiting scientists or another party). In addition, the they had made results of their research available on the Internet (unclear if it’s all or just parts of it). PST is investigating whether the research the scientists undertook can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. If so, this is a breach of export control.

On page 68 in the report there is a befitting picture of an Iranian missile test.

Wrapping it up

With Norway removing Cold War era restrictions on allied activity on Norwegian soil an increase in Russian espionage is bound to follow. Cyber will play a part of this, although it’s difficult to say how big.

With China pushing the Belt and Road Initiative Norway will have to make some tough decisions in the near future. One such example would be whether Norway will allow Chinese companies to establish, or purchase ports in the northern areas? One thing should be clear; Chinese intelligence is will be tasked with Norwegian targets in the future.

The incident at NTNU involving scientists from Iran appears as sloppy. Not necessarily by the Iranians, though it was by no means a stealthy operation, but rather by the Norwegian counterintelligence apparatus, and by NTNU as well. Procedures should be in place to detect such activity at an earlier stage. Norway is a small country – keeping tabs on a group of scientists visiting from Iran should be manageable. Criticism aside, it serves as a good case to show what kind of espionage activity one can expect that are not directed at state entities (like politicians or the military).